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Priority, Not Equality, for Possible People*
Jacob M. Nebel
How should we choose between uncertain prospects in which different possible
people might exist at different levels of well-being? Alex Voorhoeve and Marc
Fleurbaey offer an egalitarian answer to this question. I give some reasons to
reject their answer and then sketch an alternative, which I call person-affecting
prioritarianism.
How should we choose between uncertain prospects in which different
possible people might exist at different levels of well-being? Alex Voor-
hoeve and Marc Fleurbaey offer an egalitarian answer to this question.1
I explain their motivation for this answer in Section I. In Sections II and
III, I give some objections to their version of egalitarianism. In Section IV,
I sketch an alternative account of their central intuition. This account,
which I call person-affecting prioritarianism, avoids my objections to Voor-
hoeve and Fleurbaey’s egalitarianism and many of the objections to other
versions of prioritarianism.
I. HYBRID EGALITARIANISM
Suppose that you must choose between two uncertain prospects, A and
B, in which one person will come into existence. You are uncertain not
only of the future person’s welfare but also of her identity, as depicted in
table 1.2 Either Annor Bobwill exist, but you don’t knowwhich. In state 1,
Ann exists; in state 2, Bob exists. States 1 and 2 are equally probable on
* For helpful comments and discussion, I am grateful to Kara Dreher, Marc Fleurbaey,
Robert Long, Michael Otsuka, Ketan Ramakrishnan, Samuel Schefﬂer, Trevor Teitel, and
the editors.
1. Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey, “Priority or Equality for Possible People?,”
Ethics 126 (2016): 929–54.
2. I have slightly modiﬁed the case discussed by Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey. The case is
originally due to Michael Otsuka, “Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons,”
Utilitas 24 (2012): 365–80, 369.
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your evidence. The number in a person’s cell (if there is one) represents
her quantity of well-being on an interpersonal ratio scale—that is, a scale
on which ratios between numbers reﬂect how many times better off one
person is than another. (An empty cell represents nonexistence.) I assume,
following Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, that our measure of well-being is de-
rived from an idealized preference relation satisfying the axioms of ex-
pectedutility theory.3On this view, a prospect offers you greater expected
well-being just in case a fully rational agent concerned solely with your
interests would prefer it for your sake. And if such an agent would prefer
something for your sake, then it is better for you.4
In table 1, it seems harder to justify the risky prospect B than it would
be if both futures were Ann’s. For suppose that you choose B and state 1
obtains. If both futures had been Ann’s, then (for any d > 0) you could
have justiﬁed your choice to her on the grounds that B was in her ex-
pected interests—it would have maximized her expected well-being—
given what you knew at the time. But this justiﬁcation is not available
in the risky nonidentity case. B does not maximize Ann’s expected well-
being, since the future in state 2 would be Bob’s. Choosing B would seem
to sacriﬁce Ann’s interests for the sake of Bob’s. It therefore seems that,
for some d > 0 (and, of course, all d ≤ 0), you should choose A to ensure
that Ann is not so badly off.
This judgment could perhaps be explained by a prioritarian theory of
distribution. Prioritarians believe, in Derek Parﬁt’s words, that “we have
stronger reasons to beneﬁt people the worse off these people are.”5 Out-
come prioritarians believe that such reasons are stronger because beneﬁt-
3. Expected utility theory provides a cardinal scale. A ratio scale requires a meaning-
ful zero level. For possible ways of deﬁning such a level, see Charles Blackorby, Walter
Bossert, and David Donaldson, Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics,
and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 2.
4. This does not entail that preference satisfaction is what makes our lives go well, or
that goodness should be reduced to or analyzed in terms of rational preferences.





STATE 1 (0.5) STATE 2 (0.5)
Ann Bob Ann Bob
A 49 49
B 0 98 1 d
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ing the worse-off would bring about a better outcome, since (on their
view) increases in well-being make a diminishing marginal contribution
to the goodness of outcomes. Outcome prioritarians would claim that,
for some d > 0 in table 1, we ought to choose A, because doing so would,
in expectation, bring about a greater sum of priority-weighted well-being.6
Outcome prioritarianism, however, registers no difference between
the risky nonidentity case, in which B sacriﬁces Ann’s interests for the
sake of another person, and a purely intrapersonal version of the case, in
which both futures would be Ann’s. In such a purely intrapersonal case,
B would run the risk of making Ann worse off, but this risk could be jus-
tiﬁed to Ann as being in her expected interests. Given our measure of
well-being, B would be preferred for Ann’s sake if both futures would be
hers, because it would offer her greater expected well-being. The sum of
priority-weighted well-being, however, does not depend on which people
exist. Outcome prioritarianism would recommend A for the same values
of d in both the risky nonidentity case and its intrapersonal analogue.
Outcome prioritarianism, therefore, fails to respect the morally signiﬁ-
cant difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal trade-offs.7
How, then, can we explain the judgment about the risky nonidentity
case in table 1? Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey develop a version of egalitarian-
ismwhich secures this judgment. Thismay seem surprising, because there
is no objectionable inequality in the risky nonidentity case: it is not un-
fair that, under B, Ann would be worse off than Bob would have been,
had he existed. The only objectionable inequalities are between actual,
not merely possible, people.8 But Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey propose a
way of capturing the intuitive judgment without appealing to inequalities
between merely possible people.
The relevant aspect of Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s egalitarianism is
a novel view about the “currency” of distributive ethics—that is, the thing
whose distribution we ought to care about being patterned in a certain
way, and the metric by which other goods ought to be distributed.9 Voor-
hoeve and Fleurbaey’s proposed currency is a hybrid of two ingredients.
The ﬁrst is a person’s ﬁnal well-being—that is, how well off she ends up in
each outcome. The second is a person’s expected well-being conditional
on her existence—that is, how well off she would be, in expectation, con-
6. A person’s priority-weighted well-being in an outcome is given by some strictly in-
creasing, strictly concave function of her well-being.
7. Otsuka, “Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons,” 369; see also Michael
Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, “Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others:
An Argument against the Priority View,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2009): 171–99.
8. Otsuka, “Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons,” 370.
9. G. A. Cohen, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics 99 (1989): 906–44; see
also Amartya Sen, “Equality of What?,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. Sterling
McMurrin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 1:196–220.
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sidering only the outcomes in which she exists. Importantly, however, al-
thoughaperson’s ﬁnalwell-beingmakes a constantmarginal contribution
to her holdings of the hybrid currency, her conditional expected well-
being makes a decreasing marginal contribution to that currency. To
make this aspect of the view concrete, I assume that one’s holdings of
the hybrid currency can be represented by the sum of one’s ﬁnal well-
being and the square root of one’s conditional expected well-being.10 The
value of each outcome can then, according to Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s
view (which I shall call hybrid egalitarianism), be determined by applying
a standard egalitarian principle to the distribution of hybrid currency.
The value of a prospect is then identiﬁed with its expected value.
To see how hybrid egalitarianism applies to the risky nonidentity
case in table 1, suppose that d 5 2, so that Bob’s well-being in B comes
to 100 (5 981 2). Table 2 shows the resulting distributions of hybrid cur-
rency, as well as the expected value of each prospect according to hybrid
egalitarianism.
Since these outcomes involve no inequality, the value of each out-
come can be equated with the holdings of whichever person exists in that
outcome. The expected value of eachprospect is just the sumof the values
of its outcomes, weighted by their probabilities. That is why, in this setup,
A is better than B. But, unlike outcome prioritarianism, hybrid egalitari-
anism registers a morally signiﬁcant difference between interpersonal
and intrapersonal trade-offs. For if both futures were Ann’s, then B would
maximize her expected holdings of the hybrid currency (for any positive
d), since it would increase her expectation of both of its ingredients.11
10. Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey do not mention the square root function in particular—
only that it must be concave (“Priority or Equality,” 950 n. 29). I choose this function be-
cause it simpliﬁes the calculations below. It does not affect the substance of my arguments.
11. For any positive d, 0:5ð0 1 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ0:5ð0Þ 1 0:5ð98 1 dÞp Þ 1 0:5ð98 1 d 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
0:5ð0Þ 1 0:5ð98 1 dÞp Þ > 0:5ð49 1 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ0:5ð49Þ 1 0:5ð49Þp Þ 1 0:5ð49 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
0:5ð49Þ 1 0:5ð49Þp Þ.
TABLE 2
HYBRID HOLDINGS IN THE RISKY NONIDENTITY CASE
PROSPECT
STATE 1 (0.5) STATE 2 (0.5)
EXPECTED VALUEAnn Bob Ann Bob
A 49 1 √49 5 56 49 1 √49 5 56 56
B 0 100 1 √100 5 110 55
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II. THE HYBRID CURRENCY AND PERSONAL GOOD
Letme offer a different kind of risky nonidentity case, depicted in table 3.
Suppose that you are a doctor. Somepatient of yours will have a child. The
patientmight, with probability p, have a raremedical condition. If she has
this condition and youdonothing, then shewill have a child (call herCat)
whose life would be barely worth living. If your patient lacks the condition
and you do nothing, then she will have a different child (call him Dan),
whose life would be excellent.
You cannot treat the condition. But you can intervene with the pa-
tient’s uterine environment so as to settle which zygote will be produced,
regardless of the condition. Doing so, however, would make the result-
ing life worse, no matter what. Table 3 represents the options available
to you.
In state 1, the patient has the condition; in state 2, she lacks it. A is
the prospect of doing nothing. B is the prospect of intervening so as to
cause Cat to exist. C is the prospect of intervening so as to cause Dan to
exist.
Prospect A would bring about a better life, regardless of whether
your patient has the condition. It seems clear tome that A is best, and that
you therefore ought to do nothing, for any 1 ≥ p ≥ 0 and any d > 0.
According to hybrid egalitarianism, however, for any probability 1 >
p > 0, there is some d > 0 small enough that it would be wrong to choose
A. Suppose, for example, that p5 0.55 and d5 1. The resulting distribu-
tions of ﬁnal well-being, conditional expected well-being, and hybrid cur-
rency are shown in table 4. (I omit C because its ﬁgures are the same as
B’s, but for Dan.)
Because there is no inequality in these outcomes, the value of each
outcome is just the amount of hybrid currency held by each person who
exists in that outcome.A’s expected value is, therefore, 41.6 (5 0.55(2)1
0.45(90)). B’s is 42 (5 0.55(6)1 0.45(86)). So, in this setup, hybrid egal-
itarianism ranks B better than A. Hybrid egalitarianism yields this verdict
because conditional expected well-being makes a diminishing marginal
TABLE 3
THE ZYGOTIC SELECTION CASE
PROSPECT
STATE 1 (p) STATE 2 (1 – p)
Cat Dan Cat Dan
A 1 81
B 1 – d 81 – d
C 1 – d 81 – d
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contribution to the hybrid currency. If conditional expected well-being in-
steadmade a constant marginal contribution to the hybrid currency, then A
would be better, because there would then be no disadvantage to offering
different prospects to different possible people.12
This verdict seems wrong. For any 1 ≥ p ≥ 0 and any d > 0, A seems
better. We can defend this judgment by appealing to
Statewise Dominance: For any prospects X and Y, if the out-
come of X is better than the outcome of Y under every state
of the world, then X is better than Y.13
Hybrid egalitarians would, I think, accept statewise dominance.14 They
would also agree that A’s outcome in state 2 is better than B’s, because
it contains a greater quantity of hybrid currency (with no inequality). If
A’s outcome in state 1 is also better than B’s, then statewise dominance
implies that A is better. And A’s outcome in state 1 does seem better, be-
cause it makes Cat better off. We can appeal to
TABLE 4
FINAL, EXPECTED, AND HYBRID DISTRIBUTIONS
IN THE ZYGOTIC SELECTION CASE
DISTRIBUTION
STATE 1 (0.55) STATE 2 (0.45)




Hybrid 1 1 √1 5 2 81 1 √81 5 90
B:
Final 0 80
Expected 0.55(0) 1 0.45(80) 5 36 0.55(0) 1 0.45(80) 5 36
Hybrid 0 1 √36 5 6 80 1 √36 5 86
12. Suppose, e.g., that one’s quantity of the hybrid currency is given by the sum of ﬁ-
nal and (unweighted) conditional expected well-being. Then A’s expected quantity of that
currency would be 0.55(11 1)1 0.45(811 81)5 74, whereas B’s would be 0.55(01 36)1
0.45(80 1 36) 5 72.
13. John Quiggin, “Stochastic Dominance in Regret Theory,” Review of Economic Stud-
ies 57 (1990): 503–11.
14. Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve, “Decide as You Would with Full Informa-
tion! An Argument against Ex Ante Pareto,” in Inequalities in Health: Concepts, Measures,
and Ethics, ed. Nir Eyal, Samia A. Hurst, Ole F. Norheim, and Dan Wikler (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 113–28.
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The Weak Principle of Personal Good: For any outcomes X
and Y containing the same people, if X is better for everyone
than Y, then X is better than Y.15
This principle implies that A’s outcome in state 1 is better than B’s, be-
cause it is better for everyone (i.e., Cat). Since A is better than B under
both states 1 and 2, it must be better.
In applying the weak principle of personal good, I have assumed that
an outcome is better for someone if she has greater well-being in that out-
come. That is why A’s outcome in state 1 is better for Cat than B’s. Hybrid
egalitarians, however,might reject this assumption. Theymight claim that
their hybrid currency, rather than well-being, tracks personal good—that
is, goodness for a person—so that A’s outcome in state 1 would count as
worse for Cat than B’s. But this move would be hard to square with Voor-
hoeve and Fleurbaey’s measure of well-being, which I introduced at the
beginning of this article. On this view, quantities of well-being are derived
from idealized preferences satisfying the axioms of expected utility the-
ory. A prospect offers you greater expected well-being just in case a fully
rational agent concerned solely with your interests would prefer it for
your sake—in which case it is better for you.16 This makes it highly plau-
sible that an outcome in which you have greater well-being is better for
you. So, because Cat’s well-being is greater in A’s outcome in state 1 than
in B’s, A’s outcome is better for her.
Hybrid egalitarians should not jettison Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s
measure of well-being.Wemust earn the right to represent well-beingwith
numbers. If our numbers are values of an expectational utility function
which represents an idealized preference relation, thenwe knowwhat they
mean. But if they are supposed to represent something else—primitive
quantities of well-being—then they are far from obviously meaningful.17 I
do not ﬁnd myself equipped with a pretheoretic ratio scale of well-being.
Moreover, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s measure of well-being is part of what
underlies their objection tooutcomeprioritarianism:outcomeprioritarian-
ism recommends that we act against people’s expected interests in purely
intrapersonal trade-offs, as we saw in Section I. This recommendation is
highly implausible if, given ourmeasure of well-being, any prospect that of-
15. See John Broome, Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 1991). I only assume the weak principle of personal good for outcomes, not
for prospects.
16. The move from preferability to betterness might be questioned. But that would be
a nonstarter, since hybrid egalitarianism would still violate the (no less plausible) principle
that, for any outcomes X and Y containing the same people, if X would rationally be pre-
ferred to Y for the sake of each person, then X is better than Y.
17. Hilary Greaves, “Antiprioritarianism,” Utilitas 27 (2015): 1–42, however, argues
that prioritarians are better off taking quantities of well-being as primitive.
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fers you higher expected well-being ought to be preferred for your sake.18
But it may seem much less implausible if quantities of well-being are un-
derstood in some other way.
Suppose that hybrid egalitarians stick with Voorhoeve and Fleur-
baey’s measure of well-being. Then, in order to reconcile hybrid egali-
tarianism with the weak principle of personal good, they would have to
deny that outcomes in which you have greater well-being are always bet-
ter for you, while maintaining that prospects in which you have greater
expected well-being are always better for you. This move is somewhat ad
hoc, but it may have some precedent. Egalitarians sometimes claim that
people have a non-welfare-based interest in fair treatment.19 On this kind
of view, you have reason to prefer, for your sake, outcomes brought about
by deliberation that treats you fairly, even when such treatment does not
contribute to (andmay come at the expense of) your well-being. This might
seem to support a similar interest in conditional expected well-being: you
have reason to prefer, for your sake, outcomes brought about by the choice
of prospects which offer you greater expected well-being, conditional on
your existence, over and above any contribution made by such choices
to your ﬁnal well-being. Such an interest could make it rational to prefer
B’s outcome in state 1 for Cat’s sake and therefore make this outcome
better for Cat. But such an interest in conditional expected well-being can-
not be grounded in a concern for fairness. It is not unfair to Cat that her
existence in A is less robust than it is in B. She would have no grounds for
complaint if we choose A. For if we choose A and she exists, then her life
is better than it would have been had we chosen B, and no worse than
anyone else’s.
Hybridegalitarians’ interest in conditional expectedwell-beingmust,
therefore, be independent of our concern for fair treatment. But it does
not seem rational to care about conditional expected well-being in its
own right—that is, over and above any contribution to our ﬁnal well-
being, and apart from our interest in being treated fairly. On the view we
are considering, an outcome in which you have a well-being of w would
be better for you if it came about via a prospect in which your expected
well-being, conditional on your existence, was greater than w. This view
would seem to imply that if someone has been buying lottery tickets for
you (such that you would get the winnings but they pay the cost), things
are much better for you than you might have thought, even if you never
know it and your tickets never win, and even though these losing tickets
make no contribution to your well-being. This view would also seem to im-
18. See Michael Otsuka, “Prioritarianism and the Measure of Utility,” Journal of Polit-
ical Philosophy 23 (2015): 1–22.
19. See, e.g., Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey, “Egalitarianism and the Separate-
ness of Persons,” Utilitas 24 (2012): 381–98, 396.
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ply that, no matter how miserable someone’s life is, things are ultimately
quite good forher so longasher expectedwell-beingwas (perhaps at some
privileged time, such as conception) sufﬁciently high. These claims are
hard to believe, because these facts about our prospects seem irrelevant
to our attitudes about our ﬁnal situation. We do not regard our circum-
stances as much more desirable on the supposition that we had good
chances, relative to some agent’s evidence at some earlier time, of a better
life. Even if our knowledge of those chances would have made us happy,
the facts known would not have made things better for us. But such facts
would be relevant if chances at greater well-being really made outcomes
better for us, as they would if the hybrid currency tracked personal good.
So, I suspect, the hybrid currency does not track personal good; well-
being does.20
An increase in conditional expected well-being is not, in itself, worth
wanting at the expense of ﬁnal well-being. So A’s outcome in state 1 is bet-
ter for Cat than B’s. So, by the weak principle of personal good, A’s out-
come in state 1 is better overall. Since A would also be better if state 2 ob-
tains, statewise dominance implies that A is better. Thismeans that even if
conditional expectedwell-being is an ingredient of the currency of distrib-
utive ethics, its marginal contribution to that currency does not decrease.
III. UNFAIR CHANCES WITHOUT CHANCES OF UNFAIRNESS
But conditional expected well-being is not a proper ingredient of the cur-
rency of egalitarian distribution. Suppose, in our zygotic selection case,
that you have the same options as in table 3. Let p be such that, when
d5 1 in that case, A would be better than B and C even if conditional ex-
pected well-being had a decreasing marginal impact on our object of dis-
tributive concern. For example, let p 5 0.2.21
Now, I have some good news and some bad news about your patient.
The good news: she will have twins! The bad news: if she has the raremed-
ical condition (which she probably doesn’t), this will affect both twins.
Although you can still intervene to ﬁx the identity of one twin to be either
Cat or Dan, you can do nothing to affect either the identity or well-being
of the other (whom I’ll call Eve). Your options are shown in table 5.
Again,A is the prospect of doing nothing; B is the prospect of intervening
so as to ensure that Cat exists; C is the prospect of intervening so as to en-
sure that Dan exists.
20. My claim here is not that a chance of a good has no value, or is not worth wanting.
My claim is merely that it is not worth wanting over and above its expected contribution to
one’s well-being. So the unrealized chance of a good cannot make your ﬁnal situation bet-
ter for you, unless such a chance contributes to your ﬁnal well-being.
21. This would make A’s expected quantity of hybrid currency 72.4 5 0.2(2) 1 0.8
(90) and B’s 72 5 0:2ð0 1 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ0:2ð0Þ 1 0:8ð80Þp Þ 1 0:8ð80 1 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ0:2ð0Þ 1 0:8ð80Þp Þ.
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In the zygotic selection case with twins, you ought to choose A for
any d > 0. This judgment would be shared by most utilitarians, egalitari-
ans, and prioritarians. Fixing the child’s identity would bring about lower
total and average well-being, would be worse for the worst-off people in
any given outcome, and would introduce inequality in ﬁnal well-being.
And, intuitively, the presence of an unaffected twin cannot make it the
case that we ought to ﬁx the child’s identity when we would have other-
wise been obligated not to ﬁx it.
According to hybrid egalitarianism, however, it can be wrong to
choose A, for some d > 0. This is because each outcome in A involves vast
inequalities in conditional expectedwell-being.Eve’s expectedwell-being,
conditional on her existence, is 65 (5 0.2(1) 1 0.8(81)), which is much
greater than Cat’s andmuch lower than Dan’s. So if conditional expected
well-being is a component of our currency, then A’s outcomes may in-
volve a more unequal distribution of that currency than B’s and C ’s. If
d is small enough, this inequality can outweigh A’s greater quantity of ﬁ-
nal well-being.
It is not news that egalitarianism makes the value of an outcome de-
pendonthewelfareofunaffected individuals.Manypeopleﬁndthat impli-
cation objectionable. In response, many egalitarians claim that the value
of an outcome should depend on the welfare of unaffected individuals,
because their welfare can affect the fairness of an outcome. Voorhoeve
andFleurbaey, forexample, claim that it is bad,becauseunfair, thatpeople
in previous generations were better or worse off than we are now, even
though we cannot now affect their lives.22 But this response would seem
to favor A, since it is sure to bring about a more equal distribution of ﬁnal
well-being.
What counts against A, for hybrid egalitarianism, is the inequality in
conditional expected well-being. But it does not seem bad or unfair that
Cat’s conditional expected well-being is lower than Eve’s in state 1, or that
Eve’s is lower thanDan’s in state 2. An equal distribution of chances seems
TABLE 5
ZYGOTIC SELECTION CASE WITH TWINS
PROSPECT
STATE 1 (0.2) STATE 2 (0.8)
Cat Dan Eve Cat Dan Eve
A 1 1 81 81
B 1 – d 1 81 – d 81
C 1 – d 1 81 – d 81
22. Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, “Priority or Equality,” 943.
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important because it mitigates the badness of inequality in ﬁnal well-
being. It seems less unfair to make some worse off than others if each per-
son receives an equal chance of being worse off. Indeed, that is how Voor-
hoeve and Fleurbaey motivate the importance of expected well-being
within their egalitarian framework.23 But it is hard to see why an unequal
distribution of chances should be considered unfair when there is no
chance of an unequal outcome.
To see why A is not an unfair distribution of chances, consider the
matter in terms of complaints. In ordinary cases of outcome inequality,
it seems reasonable to complain that one is worse off than others through
no fault of one’s own. This makes it plausibly unfair that one is worse off
than others, through no fault of one’s own.24 The complaint is stronger,
and the unfairness greater, if one was also given a worse chance at being
well off thanothers.But if (likeCat inA)onehadnochanceofbeingworse
off than others, it does not seem reasonable to complain about the fact
that one was given a worse chance at being well off than others. For con-
sider what we would have reason to wish or to hope for if Cat’s complaint
were reasonable. Suppose we chooseA and that state 1 obtains. If we could
make Cat better off, we would of course have reason to do so. But that rea-
son is grounded in our concern for Cat’s well-being, not in a concern for
equality in conditional expected well-being. To see this, suppose that al-
though we couldn’t have made Cat better off, we could have acquired
some information that wouldhavemade itmoreprobable onour evidence
that state 1 would obtain. Acquiring this information would have lowered
Eve’s conditional expected well-being, thereby decreasing the relevant in-
equality. But that mere acquisition of information would not, I believe,
have made the outcome in any way better. A complaint that would be al-
leviated by acquiring such information is not a reasonable complaint.
Unequal chances may seem unfair when an agent causes different
people to have different chances, thereby beneﬁting people unequally.
For example, if I ﬂip a biased coin to determine the allocation of some
good to which two people have equal claims, I cause one of these people
to have better prospects than the other. Arguably, this is unfair because I
thereby beneﬁt one person more than another, by giving her a greater
chance of receiving some good that she would not have otherwise had.
But in the zygotic selection case with twins, Eve’s conditional expected
well-being depends in no way on our choice; it is higher than Cat’s only
because we are uncertain about the state of the world, not because (as in a
paradigmatically unfair lottery) we gave Eve better chances. Although, in
choosing A, we cause Cat to have a conditional expected well-being of 1,
we do not thereby cause Eve to have a conditional expected well-being of
23. Ibid., 940.
24. Larry S. Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
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65, because she would have had this expectation no matter what we did.
We therefore do not beneﬁt Cat andEve unequally, so we treat no one un-
fairly. (I say more about the signiﬁcance of beneﬁting people in Sec. IV.)
Letme summarizemy reasons for doubting that A treats Cat unfairly.
The mitigatory signiﬁcance of equal chances given unequal outcomes
does not support the claim that unequal chances are independently un-
fair. It is not reasonable to complain that one was given a worse chance at
being well off than others if one had no chance of being worse off than
others. And, although causing people to have unequal prospects may
count as unfairly beneﬁting some people more than others, this reason-
ing does not apply to unaffected individuals, whose expectations of well-
being depend in no way on our choice. These considerations count
against the hybrid egalitarian verdict in table 5. A is not unfair to Cat. So
each person’s expected well-being, conditional on her existence, is not
an ingredient of the currency of egalitarian distribution.
IV. PERSON-AFFECTING PRIORITARIANISM
If I am right that conditional expected well-being is not an ingredient of
the currency of egalitarian distribution, or that (even if it is such an ingre-
dient) its marginal contribution to that currency does not decrease, then
egalitarians seem unable to account for the intuitive judgment about the
risky nonidentity case (table 1). Let me suggest an alternative account.
Consider how Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey motivate their judgment
about the case in table 1: “It is more important to provide Ann with the
additional beneﬁt of existing at well-being level [49] rather than at [0]
if [state 1] is the case than to provide Bob with the additional beneﬁt of
existing at [98 1 d] rather than [49] if [state 2] is the case, because the
former would improve Ann’s well-being from a lower level.”25 This remark
is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it seems to appeal to something like
a prioritarian concern for increases in well-being at lower levels. Second,
this explanation appeals to the greater importance of improving Ann’s
well-being, or beneﬁting her. But neither outcome prioritarians nor hy-
brid egalitarians are particularly concerned with improvements or bene-
ﬁts. To see this, consider a version of the risky nonidentity case in which
no one could be beneﬁted, shown in table 6.
In table 6, A would not beneﬁt Bob or improve his well-being from a
lower level. If we choose A and Bob exists, then state 2 obtains, in which
case he would not have existed had we chosen B. Although we cannot jus-
tify B to Bob on the grounds that it would maximize his expected well-
being, this may not be relevant, because Bob has no complaint against
our choice. He is no worse off than he would have been otherwise, and
25. Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, “Priority or Equality,” 931.
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no worse off than anyone else. Since Bob has no complaint against our
choice, there is no need to justify it by appeal to anything other than the
expected goodness of the prospect from an impartial perspective.26 And,
I assume,Bhas greater expected value if d > 0, because it offers greater ex-
pected (total and average) well-being with no risk of inequality. We should,
therefore, choose B for any d > 0.
Things are different in the original risky nonidentity case (table 1).
There, if we chooseB, Annhas a complaint if state 1 obtains. She can com-
plain that our choice made her worse off than she would have been had
we chosen otherwise, in a way that was not in her expected interests. And,
crucially, this complaint seems stronger than Bob’s, because she is much
worse off than Bob would have been had his complaint been satisﬁed.
One’s claim to a beneﬁt is stronger, it seems, the worse off one would be
were it unsatisﬁed.
More precisely, according to
Person-Affecting Prioritarianism:
i) A person has a complaint against our choice if both (a) there is
some alternative we could have chosen under which she would
have fared better and (b) our choice fails to maximize her ex-
pected well-being, conditional on her existence.
ii) The strength of a person’s complaint against a choice is deter-
mined by the extent to which it leaves her worse off than she
would have been otherwise, and by how well off she is. A per-
son’s complaint is stronger the worse off she is.
iii) We ought to choose the prospect against which people would
have the weakest complaints, discounted by the probability that
26. I assume, following John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), 135, that impartial goodness must be assessed anonymously—i.e., in a way
that is not sensitive to “the fates of particular persons” (Michael Otsuka, “How It Makes
a Moral Difference That One Is Worse Off Than One Could Have Been,” unpublished
manuscript). On the view sketched here, beneﬁts to particular people bear on what we
ought to do, but not on the goodness of outcomes. See also Jacob Ross, “Rethinking the
Person-Affecting Principle,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (2015): 428–61.
TABLE 6
RISKY NONIDENTITY CASE WITHOUT BENEFITS
PROSPECT
STATE 1 (0.5) STATE 2 (0.5)
Ann Bob Ann Bob
A 49 49
B 0 98 1 d
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those complaints arise. If people would have no (or minimally
weak) complaints against more than one prospect, then we ought
to choose the impartially best of those.
Person-affecting prioritarianism is a deontic version of prioritarianism.
It does not say which outcomes or prospects are better than others. But
I assume, for simplicity, that if an outcome (or prospect) offers greater
(expected) total and average well-being than another, then it is better.27
I can now explain how person-affecting prioritarianism handles the
cases we have discussed. In the risky nonidentity case with beneﬁts (ta-
ble 1), person-affecting prioritarianism registers an expected complaint
against both prospects. Ann would have a complaint against B, were she
to exist, because B would harm her and fail to maximize her expected
well-being conditional on her existence. For the same reason, Bob would
have a complaint against A, were he to exist. But, for some d > 0, the com-
plaint that Ann would have is stronger than the complaint that Bob would
have, because Ann would be worse off. We, therefore, have stronger reason
to choose A. Unlike outcome prioritarianism, however, person-affecting
prioritarianism would have us choose B if both futures were Ann’s, be-
cause B would then maximize Ann’s expected well-being at no one’s ex-
pense. Ann would then lack a complaint against B and would have a com-
plaint against A. Person-affecting prioritarianism, therefore, respects the
morally signiﬁcant difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal
trade-offs.
In the risky nonidentity case without beneﬁts (table 6), person-
affecting prioritarianism registers no complaint against either act. What-
ever we choose, no one would be made worse off than she would have
been otherwise. Since there is no complaint-based reason to choose ei-
ther prospect, we should choose the impartially better prospect B.
In the zygotic selection cases (tables 3 and 5), person-affecting prior-
itarianism registers no complaint against A, because Amakes no one worse
off than she would have been otherwise. And A is better than B andC be-
cause it offers greater expected total and average well-being. Thus, we
ought to choose A. We should not intervene to bring about a worse life.
27. Person-affecting prioritarians could just as well adopt a more complicated axi-
ology—e.g., to accommodate sensitivity to inequalities in ﬁnal well-being, or to yield sen-
sible judgments in different-number cases—without affecting my arguments here. Some
person-affecting prioritarians might also think, in a pluralistic spirit, that there are other
kinds of complaints—e.g., against being made worse off than others, or against being
brought into existence with a life not worth living. Some might restrict their conception
of complaints to a narrower range of cases in which some agent (e.g., a government) has
an independent duty to distribute well-being fairly among some people (e.g., its citizens).
And some might allow complaint-based reasons to be outweighed by considerations of
goodness in certain cases (following Otsuka, “How It Makes a Moral Difference”).
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Person-affecting prioritarianism, therefore, captures the central in-
tuition that motivates hybrid egalitarianism, while avoiding its pitfalls.
Of course, person-affecting prioritarianism faces other challenges, but it
also has several other virtues; I shall not discuss those other challenges
or virtues in detail here.28
Some might wonder whether this view really deserves the name
“prioritarianism,” since it does not appeal to the diminishing marginal
value of well-being. This seems to me a merely verbal issue, so I won’t say
much about it. However, although prioritarianism is typically understood
as an impersonal axiological view, on which well-being makes a dimin-
ishingmarginal contribution to the goodness of outcomes, Parﬁt himself
notes that prioritarianism can be understood either as a view about the
goodness of outcomes or as a view about the rightness of acts.29 Thatmost
prioritarians opt for the former, axiological characterization can be fully
explained by a number of historical factors. For example, many priorita-
rians have focused exclusively on ﬁxed-population cases, in which one
can increase the sum of priority-weighted well-being only by beneﬁting
people. And many philosophers’ interest in prioritarianism derives from
adesire to reconcile consequentialism(or restrictedconsequentialist prin-
ciples) with a concern for distributive justice.30 It is, therefore, unsurpris-
ing that prioritarians have not considered the deontic person-affecting
variant proposed here. These historical considerations should not make
us doubt that person-affecting prioritarianism captures the fundamental
prioritarian insight—that weought to givepriority to theworse-off, not be-
28. One virtue: whereas outcome prioritarianism entails a particularly implausible
version of Parﬁt’s repugnant conclusion (see Campbell Brown, “Prioritarianism for Vari-
able Populations,” Philosophical Studies 134 [2007]: 325–61; Matthew D. Adler, “Future Gen-
erations: A Prioritarian View,” George Washington Law Review 77 [2008]: 1478; Nils Holtug,
Persons, Interests, and Justice [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010]), person-affecting prio-
ritarianism has no such implication, because one cannot have a complaint if one never exists.
One challenge: person-affecting prioritarianism registers no reason to improve the ﬁnal well-
being of the worse-off when doing so fails to increase anyone’s expected well-being (see
Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, “Priority or Equality,” 936). Some person-affecting prioritarians,
however, might give weight to inequality in various ways, as mentioned in n. 27. Others might
ﬁnd it wrong to sacriﬁce the expected well-being of each person for the sake of some imper-
sonal good, such as equality. I am inclined to favor the latter, less concessive route.
29. Derek Parﬁt, “Equality and Priority,” Ratio 10 (1997): 202–21, 213 n. 18. Another
deontic version of prioritarianism is proposed by AndrewWilliams, “The Priority View Bites
the Dust?,” Utilitas 24 (2012): 315–31. But, on Williams’s view (and not on mine), the
strength of our reasons to beneﬁt a person can depend on whether and how our act would
affect other people. AndWilliams does not ground his deontic view in an appeal to person-
affecting considerations.
30. See, e.g., Samuel Schefﬂer, The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investi-
gation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon,
1994), chap. 2; and Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Mo-
rality (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003), chap. 2.
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cause they are worse off than others, but rather because (in Parﬁt’s words,
again) “we have stronger reasons to beneﬁt people the worse off these peo-
ple are.” As I see it, outcome prioritarianism is just an implausible over-
generalization of this insight. It regards our reasons to beneﬁt the worse-
off as merely a special case of our more general reasons to increase the
sum of priority-weighted well-being. But the sum of priority-weighted
well-being is not, in itself, aproperobjectofmoralconcern.Priority isowed
to people and to their claims, not to quantities of well-being.
V. CONCLUSION
Unlike outcome prioritarianism, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey’s hybrid egal-
itarianism respects the morally signiﬁcant difference between intraper-
sonal and interpersonal trade-offs. But, as I showed in Section II, hybrid
egalitarianism violates statewise dominance, the weak principle of personal
good, or the tight connection between well-being and personal good. And,
as we saw in Section III, it implausibly recommends prospects that are cer-
tain to increase inequality in ﬁnal well-being, in order to prevent unobjec-
tionable inequalities in expected well-being. Person-affecting prioritaria-
nism avoids these problems while also respecting the morally signiﬁcant
difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal trade-offs.
Nebel Priority, Not Equality 911
